Touro Law Review
Volume 29
Number 4 Annual New York State Constitutional
Issue

Article 4

March 2014

Don't Feed the Deer: Misapplications of Statutory Vagueness and
the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
Brian Hodgkinson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Fourteenth
Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Hodgkinson, Brian (2014) "Don't Feed the Deer: Misapplications of Statutory Vagueness and the First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine," Touro Law Review: Vol. 29: No. 4, Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Don't Feed the Deer: Misapplications of Statutory Vagueness and the First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
Cover Page Footnote
29-4

This article is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/4

Hodgkinson: Don't Feed the Deer

DON’T FEED THE DEER: MISAPPLICATIONS OF
STATUTORY VAGUENESS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE
COUNTY COURT, SULLIVAN COUNTY
NEW YORK
People v. Gabriel1
(decided September 5, 2012)
Appellant Robert Gabriel was convicted in the Town of Highland Justice Court for violating a provision of the New York State
Environmental Conservation Law prohibiting feeding wild whitetailed deer or wild moose save for five enumerated exceptions.2 On
appeal, the County Court addressed three issues: first, whether sufficient evidence existed to convict the appellant of feeding white-tailed
deer in violation of the statute; second, whether the statute was unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied; and third, whether the statutory limitation upon First Amendment rights was unconstitutionally overbroad.3 The first issue was summarily resolved by the
appellant’s admission of placing food in his backyard that attracted
deer, which under the statutory language constituted “feeding.”4 Applying a two-part test to the second issue, statutory vagueness, the
court concluded the statutory language neither provided adequate notice for a “person of ordinary intelligence” nor “clear standards of enforcement” for officials.5 Consequently, the court held the statute
both facially vague and vague as applied, and therefore violative of

1

950 N.Y.S.2d 874 (Co. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 877-78; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 189.3 (2010).
3
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 879-81.
4
Id. at 880 (“ ‘Feed’ or ‘feeding’ is defined as ‘the act of using, placing, giving, exposing,
depositing, distributing or scattering any material, or any act to maintain the availability of
such material, that attracts wild white-tailed deer to feed on such material including the distribution of such material in deer wintering areas.’ ” (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 6, § 189.2(f))).
5
Id. at 881-83.
2

949
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Gabriel’s constitutional right to due process.6 Finally, the court examined the statute under the First Amendment’s “overbreadth doctrine.”7 It forged a link between feeding wild animals and First
Amendment speech protections by claiming that the former could be
expressive conduct in support of conservation.8 Under this rubric it
held the statute’s prohibition of actions and materials that could “attract” or “feed” white-tailed deer was unconstitutionally broad.9
This Note surveys the New York and federal approaches to
statutory vagueness and First Amendment overbreadth challenges.
Part I.A discusses the facts of People v. Gabriel, which is the subject
of this article’s critique in Part IV. Parts I.B and I.C examine the decision’s resolution of statutory vagueness and overbreadth claims respectively. Part II.A analyzes the federal method applied to resolving
statutory vagueness challenges. Part II.B explores federal First
Amendment overbreadth jurisprudence. Part III.A reviews New
York’s approach to statutory vagueness claims, illustrating doctrinal
dissension where the challenge is facial rather than as applied. Part
III.B examines the overbreadth doctrine in New York case law,
which mirrors its federal counterpart. Part IV evaluates the court’s
decision in People v. Gabriel, proffering that it incorrectly resolved
statutory vagueness and overbreadth challenges in a manner perverse
to both federal and New York jurisprudence.
I.

THE OPINION
A.

Facts

On October 13, 2009, Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) officer Michael Bello received an anonymous call
about a pile of apples and a deer stand located in the woods behind
the appellant’s property.10 Suspicious of possible DEC violations in
the wake of the approaching hunting season, officer Bello proceeded
6

Id. at 884.
Id. (“The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine provides that ‘a statute that attempts to
proscribe constitutionally protected speech will not be enforced unless a limiting construction effectively removes the apparent threat to constitutionally protected expression.’ ”
(quoting People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 128 (N.Y. 2000))).
8
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
9
Id. at 886.
10
Id. at 878.
7
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to stake out the location, during which he viewed no activity at the
deer stand.11 During the following several days, he received two
more calls and proceeded to further investigate the area.12 These subsequent investigations indicated that deer had been feeding on the
trail near the stand.13 In light of these indications, officer Bello
knocked on the door of the property and inquired into the circumstances.14 Gabriel told officer Bello that he was unaware of the deer
stand and that he occasionally fed animals that came into his backyard.15 Gabriel conceded that he placed apples in the backyard to
feed wildlife, though he denied feeding deer.16 At the bench trial,
Gabriel inquired into whether it was an offense to merely throw apples into his backyard and the judge responded, “You are not allowed
to throw those apples out there. You are not permitted to do it . . . . I
understand that if you have a bird feeder in your yard that attracts the
deer, we can get in trouble for that.”17 Although Gabriel failed to
preserve certain issues at trial, the County Court exercised its discretion to review them as a matter of justice and because they raised
constitutional concerns.18 Specifically, Gabriel challenged the constitutionality of the statute’s vagueness and overbreadth.19
B.

Constitutional Claims: Vagueness

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits conviction under a law that “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.”20 Effectuating this doctrine, the court laid out a twopart test to determine whether the statute was unconstitutionally
vague under the Due Process Clause.21 The first part requires a de-

11

Id.
Id.
13
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (Officer Bello noted deer droppings and a photograph
from a “trail cam” as evidence that deer had been feeding in the area).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 878-79.
16
Id. at 879.
17
Id. (emphasis in original).
18
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
19
Id. at 881.
20
Id. (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010)).
21
Id. at 881.
12
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termination that the law provides a person of ordinary intelligence
with fair notice of the prohibited action.22 The second part necessitates clear standards of enforcement for officials tasked with executing the law.23 Gabriel asserted that the statute was both facially
vague and vague as applied to his particular case.24 The court addressed the facial challenge first.25
The ambiguity at issue stemmed from the meaning of the
words “material” and “feeding” in NYCRR title 6, section 189. Applying the test’s first prong, the court determined that because the
statute failed to expand on what constituted “material,” and also what
actions would be considered “feeding,” the statute gave inadequate
notice of the prohibited actions.26 It determined that “a person of ordinary intelligence” would be unable to ascertain whether his or her
actions were illegal.27 Similarly, officials charged with implementing
the law lacked sufficient guidance regarding what activities were
prohibited.28 The resultant opacity, the court reasoned, enhanced the
potential for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.29 Resolving
the statute’s facial ambiguity, the court held that because it was facially vague, its application to Gabriel was unconstitutional.30
C.

Constitutional Claims: Overbreadth

Before evaluating the statute’s alleged overbreadth, the court
affirmed Gabriel’s standing to bring the issue.31 It reasoned that although his conduct was unprotected by the First Amendment, his
challenge was nonetheless proper under its overbreadth doctrine.32
22

Id.
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
24
Id. at 882.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 882.
27
Id. The court gave as examples seemingly harmless and ordinary actions that could be
held illegal under the statute if they attracted deer, such as planting a fruit tree or putting out
garbage that may contain “material.” Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 883. Subsequent to this determination, the court also held that had the statute not
been facially vague, its application to Gabriel would have been unconstitutionally vague as
applied. Id. at 884.
31
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
32
Id. at 884 (“The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine provides that ‘a statute that attempts to proscribe constitutionally protected speech will not be enforced unless a limiting
construction effectively removes the apparent threat to constitutionally protected expres23
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Effectively, due to the statute’s potential to limit protected speech
and its lack of any limiting construction, the court allowed Gabriel to
raise the First Amendment challenge.33
In a manner similar to its Due Process analysis, the court
enunciated several factors to determine whether a statute was overbroad. It began with the notion that if the statute “on its face,” that is
to say in its aggregate rather than in single conceived applications,
prohibits a substantial amount of protected conduct, then it is overbroad.34 Additionally, the court warned that regulations of protected
speech “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate interest.”35 This requirement demands that prohibitions not be
substantially broader than necessary to achieve that legitimate governmental interest.36 Proceeding to implement these analyses, the
court determined the conduct prohibited by the statute could be an
expression of support for conservation.37 Thus, the conduct could be
evaluated as a First Amendment protection, triggering the foregoing
restraints on overbreadth.
The court refrained from an extensive examination of the
statute’s substantive legitimacy, although it indicated doubts about it,
and instead focused on its scope.38 Excoriating the statute’s
overbreadth came as a corollary to the court’s treatment of the statutory vagueness issue. The broad language that clouded the statute’s
meaning also expanded the breadth of conduct which could reasonably be interpreted as impermissible.39 Recognizing this, the court
held the statute’s language rendered it substantially overbroad, and
“not narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interests.”40
The statute’s overbreadth and vagueness implicated one another, as
sion.’ ”) (quoting Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 128)).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 885.
36
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
37
Id. at 884.
38
See id. (“There is a genuine dispute as to whether this regulation serves a significant
governmental interest in preventing the spread of CWD. Without addressing the merits of
CWD regulations as applicable in New York, the Court must ask if the gathering of deer
around a legal food plot as opposed to the proverbial apple tree is not also a concern for
CWD transmission?”).
39
See id at 885 (“Not only does this statute criminalize any type of feeding of deer, but
broad language like ‘placing,’ ‘exposing,’ or ‘depositing’ creates myriad situations in which
one could violate the statute without any intention of feeding deer or moose.”).
40
Id. at 885.
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the court concluded “[t]he broad sweeping language of the regulation
chills constitutionally protected conduct and leaves law enforcement
in a position to arbitrarily enforce the law. The literal meaning of
words like ‘material,’ ‘deposit’ and ‘maintain’ leave open an application of the regulation far beyond what the legislature plausibly intended.”41
II.

FEDERAL APPROACH
A.

Vagueness

Federal jurisprudence is replete with challenges arising from
purported statutory vagueness and their resolution by its “void-forvagueness” doctrine rests on settled principles.42 Throughout the
greater part of the Supreme Court’s history, these challenges have
been mechanisms for social, political, and economic action.43 Primarily at issue are notions of due process arising under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.44 However, the interpretive breadth resulting from statutory vagueness may also implicate constitutionally protected speech, raising First Amendment concerns.45 The Supreme
Court has developed a two-part analysis for resolving these challenges, which is modified when protected speech is affected,46 known as
the void-for-vagueness doctrine.47
The first part examines whether the statute provides proper
notice or fair warning of the prohibited conduct.48 Courts have
hinged proper notice on whether “a person of ordinary intelligence
41

Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003) (discussing the long history of constitutional challenges to statutory vagueness); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n.7 (1974) (“The elements of the void-for-vagueness doctrine have been developed in a large body of precedent
from this Court.”).
43
Goldsmith, supra note 42.
44
The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process against federal action whereas the Fourteenth Amendment does so against state action. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(discussing various protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment against state action).
45
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573.
46
Id. at n.10.
47
While the analysis has two “prongs,” both are not required to invalidate a statute for
vagueness. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (invalidating ordinance
solely on its failure to limit discretionary enforcement by police).
48
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2718.
42
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[would have] fair notice of what is prohibited.”49 Indeed, the principle is an axiom of laws that comport with due process.50 However,
like the statutes to which it is applied, the language is often ambiguous regarding what its interpretation entails.51 Whether a statute provides proper notice is an inherently flexible and often unclear determination.52 Consequently, as Justice Holmes ominously observed,
“[T]he law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . . If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur
a fine or a short imprisonment . . . [but] he may incur the penalty of
death.”53 Incident to the first part, the second requires that the statute
provide clear standards of enforcement for officials tasked with its
implementation.54 This second requirement ensures protection
against “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”55 Additionally,
where the degree of statutory vagueness encroaches on protected
speech by dissuading people from engaging in such speech, courts
have required a heightened degree of specificity. 56 The foregoing
analysis was on display in Smith v. Goguen.57
In Goguen, the defendant was convicted of violating a Massachusetts flag misuse statute, which prohibited mutilating, trampling
upon, defacing, or treating contemptuously the flag of the United
States.58 He had worn a small patch of the flag sewn onto the seat of
his trousers and was charged with “contemptuously [treating] the flag
of the United States” and sentenced to six months in jail.59 Applying
49

Id.
See Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“It is a
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are
not clearly defined.”).
51
Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 280-81 (claiming the Supreme Court has issued sweeping
and contradictory statements on the vagueness doctrine).
52
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110 (“Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.”).
53
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
54
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573.
55
Id.; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (“A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”).
56
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 568-69.
59
Id. at 568, 570.
50
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the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the Court characterized the statutory
language at issue as “vague ‘not in the sense that it requires a person
to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all.’ ”60 Such deficiencies preclude cognizant inclusion
in and exclusion from prohibited conduct, wherein lies the Due Process offense.61
Addressing the standards provided for enforcement, the Court
lambasted the language as “allow[ing] policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections.”62 Further, deeming the
language that the defendant was convicted under as “capable of
reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment,” the Court
held a greater degree of specificity was required to save the statute.63
The Goguen decision illustrates that while federal courts are concerned with proper notice being provided to citizens, of greater concern is the potential for unchecked and possibly discriminatory enforcement granted by vague statutes.64
B.

Overbreadth

Generally, a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally
applied lacks the standing to challenge that statute’s constitutionality
as applied to other litigants.65 The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine is an exception to this generality.66 Federal courts have recognized that elastic boundaries circumscribe the First Amendment
and thus its treatment should allow it to pulsate.67 Bearing that in
mind, the Supreme Court has permitted litigants to challenge a statute’s validity, notwithstanding its applicability to their situation,
60

Id. at 578 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578.
62
Id. at 575.
63
Id. at 573. The Court also made a comparison to the less exacting degree of specificity
required for statutes “regulating purely economic activity,” whose scope does raise the same
First Amendment concerns. Id. at n.10.
64
See id. at 575 (“Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, voiced a concern, which we
share, against entrusting lawmaking ‘to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman
on his beat.’ ”); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578 (“The deficiency is particularly objectionable in
view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and triers of
fact.”) (emphasis added).
65
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).
66
Id. at 612-13.
67
Id. at 611.
61
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when it is substantially overbroad.68 The Court has, however, recognized the severe implications of such action,69 and accordingly has
applied it “sparingly and only as a last resort . . . [and not] when a
limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged
statute.”70 Further, it has qualified the doctrine’s application depending on whether speech or conduct was being regulated.71 Particular
attention has been given to the latter, where the Court has required
that the overbreadth be “real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”72 In Virginia v. Hicks73
the Court illustrated the doctrine’s stringency when applied to conduct.74
The regulation at issue in Hicks was promulgated by The
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (“RRHA”), a Virginia state agency, which authorized police to serve notice upon any
individual whose presence on its property lacked “a legitimate business or social purpose;” and further, to subsequently arrest the person
if the notice went unheeded.75 Respondent Hicks, after violating the
regulation several times, was convicted under Virginia’s repeat trespass statute.76 Conceding his conduct was not constitutionally protected and that the trespass statute he was charged under was valid,
Hicks challenged the constitutional validity of the RRHA policy as
overbroad.77 Addressing that contention, the Court re-affirmed principles enunciated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.78 It cautioned that facially invalidating a law may vitiate the benefits sought by narrowing
its expansive scope.79 Moreover, it counseled that “there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks
application of a law[,] . . . especially to constitutionally unprotected

68
Id. at 619. The Supreme Court’s rationale stemmed from “a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Id. at 612.
69
See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 (calling the doctrine’s application “strong medicine”).
70
Id. at 613.
71
Id. at 615.
72
Id.
73
539 U.S. 113 (2003).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 116.
76
Id. at 117.
77
Id. at 118.
78
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610.
79
Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119.
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conduct.”80
In denying Hicks’s claim, the court held the RRHA policy did
not prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech.81 Because the
policy language “legitimate business or social purpose” applied to all
forms of conduct, the Court reasoned, the degree of protected conduct
which may possibly be prohibited was minimal compared with the
valid prohibitions against non-constitutionally protected conduct.82
The Court reinforced its conclusion stating it was “not surprising,
since the overbreadth doctrine’s concern with ‘chilling’ protected
speech ‘attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct.’ ” 83 And additionally, “[r]arely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or to conduct necessarily associated with speech
(such as picketing or demonstrating).”84
III.

NEW YORK APPROACH
A.

Statutory Vagueness: As Applied and Facially

Similar to federal courts, New York employs the aforementioned void-for-vagueness doctrine to resolve statutory vagueness
challenges.85 The Court of Appeals has distinguished as applied challenges from facial challenges based on what they entail and how their
resolutions affect each other.86 A determination that a statute is
vague as applied rests on finding its constitutional application to the
challenger’s particular facts.87 In contrast, a challenge to a statute’s
facial validity requires the “heavy burden” of proving the statute is
vague in all its applications.88 Courts are reticent to hold a statute fa80

Id.
Id. at 124.
82
Id. at 123.
83
Id. at 124 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
84
Hicks, 539 U.S. at 124.
85
People v. Stuart, 797 N.E.2d 28, 34 (N.Y. 2003).
86
Id. at 36.
87
Id. at 35.
88
Id. Courts are especially concerned with statutes that fail to specify standards of conduct, with the concern being arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. See Goguen, 415 U.S.
at 575. Similar to federal courts, the New York Court of Appeals has hinted that the second
prong, standards of enforcement, may be the most important. See People v. Nelson, 506
81
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cially vague because such a decision invalidates it entirely, as opposed to finding a statute is vague as applied, which only bars its application in the particular instance.89 Consequently, the New York
approach first examines the statutory validity as applied to the situation at issue.90
If the court determines a statute is constitutionally permissible
as applied, it will further reach the tacit conclusion that it is also facially constitutional.91 This rule, known as the “no valid applications
rule,” is premised on the idea that if “there was at least one person as
to whom the statute could be applied constitutionally, [it is] implicitly
determined [to be] valid on its face.”92 While the principles of fairness underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine stem from common
notions of reason and natural law,93 there has been discord within
New York’s highest court over the validity of the “no valid applications rule.” This disagreement and New York’s approach to statutory
vagueness challenges were displayed in People v. Stuart.94
Stuart concerned as applied and facial vagueness challenges
to a New York statute prohibiting stalking.95 The statutory language
at issue was “no legitimate purpose,” which the defendant claimed
was insufficient to provide a person of ordinary intelligence proper

N.E.2d 907, 909 (N.Y. 1987) (“The Constitution abhors a law placing unfettered discretion
in the hands of police, prosecutors and juries and allowing punishment of the poor or unpopular on a whim.”); Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 35 (holding adequate guidelines for law enforcement may be the vagueness doctrine’s most important aspect).
89
Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 35-36.
90
Id. at 36.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 37.
93
See id. at 33 (“It is axiomatic that a proscriptive law must provide people with reasonable notice of the conduct it prohibits.”).
94
Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 37.
95
Id. The stalking statute at issue, “Stalking in the fourth degree,” provided in relevant
part:
[A] person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree if he or she (1) intentionally and for no legitimate purpose (2) engages in a course of conduct directed
at a specific person (3) when he knows or reasonably should know that his
conduct will have either of two consequences: first, that it is likely to cause
reasonable fear of material harm to the victim’s (or other specified third party’s) physical health, safety or property . . . or second, that the conduct causes material harm to the victim’s mental or emotional health and consists of
following, telephoning or initiating communication with the victim (or other
specified third party) after being clearly told to stop.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (McKinney 1999).
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notice.96 He further contested the statute’s failure to qualify the type
of intent that was prohibited.97 Specifically, the statute proscribed a
course of conduct, but not the ends intended to be reached by that
conduct, which the defendant alleged compounded the vagueness.98
In this regard, the defendant argued that the statute fell short of
achieving sufficient clarity.99
Addressing these challenges, the court held the statutory conduct was clearly delineated, thus a perpetrator’s intent was irrelevant.100 Here, the defendant continuously followed, stared at, and approached the complainant.101 Under the statutorily proscribed
conduct, the defendant had ample notice that his actions were prohibited and any reasonable person could have understood as much.102
Further, the language “legitimate purpose,”103 the court reasoned,
should be read as its ordinary meaning, but within the statutory context.104 Therefore, a person engaged in actions such as the defendant’s would be on reasonable notice that he lacked a “legitimate purpose” under the statutory rubric, which bears a clear account of its
proscribed conduct.105 While the challenged statute’s clarity was
unanimous among the court, the concurrence exhibited doctrinal dissension with the majority’s affirmation of the “no valid applications
rule.”106
The concurrence took issue with the limitations that the “no
valid applications rule” placed on prospective facial challenges.107
As applied challenges to statutes may be unsuccessful even though
the statute is facially vague.108 This results from the manner in which
96

Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 39.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 30.
102
Id. at 39.
103
The court defined the ordinary meaning of “no legitimate purpose” as “the absence of
expression of ideas or thoughts other than threats and/or intimidating or coercive utterances”
Id. at 41.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 41-42 (Kaye, J., concurring).
107
Id. at 44.
108
See id. (illustrating an instance where a facially vague statute nonetheless survives an
as applied challenge because the conduct fits “squarely within the ‘hard core’ of the statute’s
proscriptions”) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608).
97
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vagueness shades particular circumstances, as the concurrence explained, “[A] facially vague statute fails to give anyone notice of its
limits, even though everyone might understand its core, and even
though it may not be unconstitutional as applied to this core.”109 Emphasizing the primary importance of clear guidelines for law enforcement, the test’s second prong, the concurrence further stressed
that although valid as applied, a statute may nonetheless lack the
clear standards for enforcement.110 As the concurrence illustrated,
“the second prong mandates that a statute not permit or encourage
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by the police. The test is not
whether an officer actually exercised discretion arbitrarily in a given
case.”111
This point echoes the language previously used, “though everyone might understand its core,” in that although an official’s response in a particular case may not be discriminatory as it related to a
given set of facts, the relevant inquiry is whether the statute provides
the official with sufficient guidelines.112 Thus, the concurrence concluded “an analysis of the second prong ‘as applied’ to a defendant
has no discernible meaning; the very nature of a second-prong analysis is inherently a facial one.”113 The foregoing illustrates the court’s
disagreement over the appropriate analysis for vagueness challenges.
Indeed, the opinions differ on the appropriate New York and federal
precedent attached to the issue,114 which indicates greater opacity accompanies the initially clear two-pronged vagueness analysis.
B.

Overbreadth

New York’s overbreadth doctrine is taken from federal jurisprudence and is less contentious than its vagueness analysis. Similar
to its federal counterpart, the doctrine is an exception to the general
rule against third-party standing stemming from the concern that a
law’s expansive scope may dissuade people from exercising their
First Amendment rights.115 Its main inquiry focuses on “whether the

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 43 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 44 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 38 n.10.
Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 128.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 4

962

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

law on its face prohibits a real and substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.”116 If the prohibition stems from a content-neutral regulation of “time, place, and manner of expression,” it
is enforceable as long as it is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave[s] open ample alternative channels of
communication.”117 The prohibition is content-neutral if it does not
stem from the government’s disagreement with that speech or conduct; in other words, the primary inquiry is into the government’s
motive for enacting the restriction.118 Upon finding that a restriction
is content-neutral, courts examine whether the “regulation promotes a
substantial government interest” by means that are not broader than
necessary to fulfill that interest.119 The means adopted do not have to
be the least restrictive available, but rather the legislature is afforded
flexibility in determining which methods are best suited to constitutionally achieving its valid aims.120 In New York’s highest court, the
doctrine has not seen the same contention as vagueness challenges
have. However, the broad language attending overbreadth jurisprudence leaves lower courts with the leeway to use it in a more liberal
fashion than it was perhaps intended for. The court in Gabriel exemplified this notion.
IV.

MISAPPLICATIONS: OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS

Rather than providing a mechanism for judicial action,121 the
overbreadth doctrine is intended to serve as additional protection for
First Amendment rights.122 As Gabriel illustrates, however, broad
language allows for expansion and contraction within that language,
116

People v. Barton, 861 N.E.2d 75, 79 (N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added).
Id. at 80 (quoting Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness of New Orleans, Inc. v. City of
Baton Rouge, 876 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1989)).
118
Barton, 861 N.E.2d at 80.
119
Id. at 81 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
120
Id.
121
One commentator aptly noted: “The overbreadth doctrine is quite clearly outside the
pantheon of ‘passive virtues.’ Rather than serving to postpone and limit the scope of judicial
review, it asks that review be hastened and broadened. It results often in the wholesale invalidation of the legislature’s handiwork, creating a judicial-legislative confrontation.” The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852 (1970).
122
See Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601 (outlining the aims and uses of the overbreadth doctrine);
see also Barton, 861 N.E.2d at 81 (“The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does
not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decision maker concerning the most
appropriate method for promoting significant government interests or the degree to which
those interests should be promoted.”).
117
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leading to unduly active decisions. For instance, the court in Gabriel
questioned the legislative rationale behind the statute, contemplating
situations that spoke to the statute’s substantive validity and efficacy.123 Testing a statute’s significant governmental interest in such a
manner is contrary to the language in Barton, which Gabriel relied
upon in its overbreadth analysis.124 The court’s apparent overzealousness in Gabriel in applying the overbreadth doctrine can be tied to
its interpretation of broad precedential language. Considering the
calls for reluctance associated with the doctrine, the court may have
applied it too readily. Courts have cautioned that the doctrine is a
drastic measure, or “strong medicine,” reserved for laws that infringe
upon a substantial amount of protected speech.125 That the law here
is a content-neutral restriction on conduct bolsters those caveats, as
the doctrine’s already limited applicability attenuates when the behavior at issue is conduct rather than pure speech.126 The opinion in
Gabriel failed to even mention, and thus presumably consider, these
reservations. Rather, in invalidating the statute entirely the court opted for the most drastic measure. Alternatively, and to avoid frustrating legislative objectives and resultant delays, it could have crafted a
less restrictive interpretation or demarcated a line of application from
which subsequent decisions could act from.127 Either would have
been preferable here, where the conduct was not pure-speech and in
its expressive form, conservation, there existed alternative avenues of
communication. Similar to its application of the overbreadth doctrine, the court too readily invalidated the statute on vagueness
grounds.
Facial invalidation requires the litigant to show that a statute

123
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (“There is a genuine dispute as to whether this regulation
serves a significant governmental interest in preventing the spread of CWD. Without addressing the merits of CWD regulations as applicable in New York, the Court must ask if the
gathering of deer around a legal food plot as opposed to the proverbial apple tree is not also a
concern for CWD transmission?”).
124
See Barton, 861 N.E.2d at 81. Additionally, criticizing the apparent overbreadth and
inconsistency of the statute, the court in Gabriel reasoned that “[i]t is also not disputed that
planting food crops, fruit trees, or cutting brush for deer to eat does not ‘concentrate the animals and create extensive face-to-face contact’ with deer; this type of feeding is encouraged
by the DEC to conserve the deer population.” Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 885. However,
drawing on Barton, whether certain proscriptions against feeding deer appear inconsistent
with other such lawful practices is outside the judicial purview.
125
Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 128; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
126
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
127
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 121, at 862.
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is invalid in all of its applications.128 Accordingly, and as a prerequisite, litigants must first demonstrate the inapplicability of the
statute as applied to their situation; the inability to do so means the
statute is facially valid.129 In Gabriel, however, the court addressed
the statute’s facial challenge prior to the as applied challenge, holding
“[b]ecause the regulation [was] facially vague and therefore unconstitutional, its application to Appellant is also unconstitutional.”130
While that assertion is true, it is premised on the assumption that the
statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Gabriel. Having established the statute’s facial invalidity, the court had to show its invalidity as applied to Gabriel, otherwise its holding of facial invalidity
would have been erroneous. The proper analytical cadence is important because it ensures a certain degree of measure before invalidating a statute in toto, which courts are rightly hesitant to do.131
Here, the court’s proclivity to invalidate the statute was illustrated by
its overbreadth and vagueness analyses. Upon determining the statute was facially invalid, the court gave a terse and conclusory statement as to why the statute was invalid as applied to Gabriel, which
was essentially a repetition of its prior analysis on facial invalidity.
This analysis is further undermined by the court’s apparent admission
of the statute’s validity as applied to Gabriel: “While the statute as
applied in this case does validly prohibit conduct not protected under
the First Amendment . . . .”132 Further, by the court’s admission and
the statute’s clear language, the law was intended to prohibit feeding
deer, which Gabriel admitted to doing.133 Any reasonable person
would have been on notice that the statute proscribed feeding deer.
Thus, as applied to Gabriel the statute appears constitutionally clear,
and as a result facially valid.
Similar to its overbreadth treatment, the court’s resolution of
Gabriel’s vagueness challenge was drastic and failed to give suffi128
Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 37; see also Morales, 527 U.S. at 77 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing facial challenges as “go-for-broke” propositions requiring the litigant to show
no valid application exists).
129
Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 37.
130
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
131
See Stuart, 797 N.E.2d at 36 (“[F]acial challenges to statutes are generally disfavored
and legislative enactments carry a strong presumption of constitutionality.”); see also Morales, 527 U.S. at 77 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging restraint from facial invalidation).
132
Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d at 885. But see id. at 884 (“The regulation is therefore also unconstitutional as applied to Appellant.”).
133
Id. at 883, 885; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 189.3.
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cient consideration to alternative solutions, such as applying a narrowing construction.134 “Restraint is a counsel of prudence,”135 and
in the instant case the court would have exercised such had it given
more thought to why facial invalidity and the overbreadth doctrine
are approached cautiously and applied sparingly.

Brian Hodgkinson*

134

The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 121, at 862.
Id. at 849.
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